The consequences of faking anger in negotiations

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HIGHLIGHTS
► In two experiments, we examine the consequences of faking anger in negotiations
► Faking anger increases the demands of negotiation counterparts
► Faking anger has this effect because it erodes trust

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ABSTRACT
Past research has found that showing anger induces cooperative behavior from counterparts in negotiations. We build on and extend this research by examining the effects of faking anger by surface acting (i.e., showing anger that is not truly felt inside) on the behavior of negotiation counterparts. We specifically propose that surface acting anger leads counterparts to be intransigent due to reduced trust. In Experiment 1, surface acting anger increased demands in a face-to-face negotiation, relative to showing no emotion, and this effect was mediated by (reduced) trust. In Experiment 2, surface acting anger increased demands in a video-mediated negotiation, relative to showing no emotion, and this effect was explained by (reduced) trust, as in Experiment 1. By contrast, deep acting anger (i.e., showing anger that is truly felt inside) decreased demands, relative to showing no emotion, and this effect was explained by (increased) perceptions of toughness, consistent with prior research on the effects of showing anger in negotiations. The findings show that a complete understanding of the role of anger in negotiations requires attention to how it is regulated. In addition, the results suggest that faking emotions using surface acting strategies may generally be detrimental to conflict resolution.

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Introduction
Research on conflict resolution has repeatedly found that negotiators cooperate when their opponents display anger. Across several studies, negotiators made larger concessions to angry opponents than to neutral or happy opponents (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). This research suggests that expressing anger can be an effective way to evoke cooperative behavior in others and get things done. But what happens when negotiators display anger that they do not truly feel? Does faking anger also elicit cooperation?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that it may not. After the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the spring of 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama was criticized for his calm response to the incident (Pareene, 2010). He eventually showed anger about the incident on a television show, but his display further undermined his support, because his display was deemed not to be genuine. Obama drew considerable skepticism (Raum, 2010), and veteran newscaster Sam Donaldson commented that “That's not him” (Chalian, 2010). This anecdote suggests that showing anger that is not truly felt may not induce cooperation, and that it may even backfire. To illuminate this issue, in two experiments, we examined the effects of surface acting anger – efforts to show anger that one does not feel – on the behavior of negotiation counterparts.

Past findings on the effects of expressing anger in negotiations

Past research has shown that displays of anger are interpreted as signals of dominance and toughness (Knutson, 1996; Tiedens, 2001) that intimidate others and persuade them to comply (Averill, 1983). Studies of leadership, for instance, found that leaders' displays of anger influenced subordinates to exert more effort toward their tasks (Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005), especially when subordinates paid close attention to the information contained in these displays (Van Kleef et al., 2009).

Past research on negotiations has identified effects that are consistent with these findings. Individuals who negotiated with angry opponents believed that these opponents were tough, had ambitious goals, and were unlikely to make substantial concessions (Van Kleef,
et al., 2004a). In turn, they tended to make large concessions to angry opponents. In one study, participants made larger concessions to angry opponents than to non-emotional or happy opponents because participants believed that angry opponents had more ambitious goals (Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Likewise, in another study, participants perceived angry counterparts as tougher than non-emotional counterparts, and this led participants to concede more to angry counterparts (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). These findings suggest that negotiators who show anger elicit concessions from their counterparts because these responses are perceived to be tough.

The previous studies, however, do not cover all of the potential effects of showing anger in negotiations. In previous studies, participants had no reason to doubt that their counterparts did not truly feel the anger that they displayed. For instance, in the studies conducted by Van Kleef et al. (2004a), participants received a message from their counterparts that they were angry (without actually seeing their counterparts and their facial displays of anger). In addition, participants were led to believe that their counterparts did not know that their emotional reactions would be sent to the participants. Participants had an explicit reason to believe that their counterparts’ expressions were real rather than faked for strategic reasons. Thus, in these studies, there was nothing to indicate that the counterparts might not have actually felt angry. The past findings may primarily concern the effects of anger that is presumed to be truly felt, and not necessarily the effects of showing anger that one does not truly feel. The effects may be different when displayed anger is not truly felt, because the discrepancy between the displayed and felt anger has consequences for the authenticity of the expressions.

The consequences of surface acting anger for the authenticity of the displays

Individuals often fake anger – by showing anger that they do not genuinely feel – to achieve their personal goals and promote their own interests (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). For instance, in one study, participants acknowledged expressing more anger than they felt to influence another person to make better offers in an ultimatum game (Andrade & Ho, 2009). In another study, managers indicated that they sometimes deliberately showed anger that they did not feel to influence their subordinates (Fitness, 2000). And, one investigation showed that bill collectors displayed anger even when they felt a different emotion, because this strategy was deemed most effective by their organization to compel certain debtors to pay (Sutton, 1991). These findings support the notion that faking anger will prevent negotiators from being perceived as having lower quality relationships (Gross & John, 2003). These findings suggest that during negotiations, surface acting anger may lead to different behaviors from counterparts than expressing anger that is truly felt or showing no emotions.

The consequences of surface acting anger in negotiations

We propose that in the context of negotiations, surface acting reduces trust. Trust is defined as expectations of goodwill, benevolence, and integrity in the other party (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; Kramer, 1999; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), and assurance that the other party will not exploit them (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Negotiators may infer that because the anger is not truly felt, their counterparts do not have a valid reason for being angry. Negotiators may infer that the counterparts have not been treated unfairly, otherwise they would truly be angry, given that anger tends to arise when one has been treated unfairly by others (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Thus, negotiators may interpret displays by counterparts who surface act anger as dishonest, opportunistic, and calculated attempts to control them (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). In turn, negotiators may believe that they are at risk of being exploited when their counterparts pretend to be angrier than they really are as a result of surface acting.

Support for this reasoning is indirect yet suggestive. In previous investigations, participants exhibited more trust, assigned more favorable traits (e.g., honesty), and cooperated more in a prisoner’s dilemma and a trust game when others displayed authentic rather than inauthentic smiles (Johnston, Miles, & Macrae, 2010; Krumbhuber et al., 2007). These findings support the notion that faking anger will erode the trust of negotiation counterparts.

In turn, past research suggests that negotiators who do not trust each other protect themselves from potential harm in an effort to ensure that they are not exploited (Ferrin et al., 2007; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). If negotiators perceive that their opponents lack integrity, they may believe that their opponents may be willing to take advantage of them. Negotiators who do not trust each other are thus particularly likely to adopt a competitive stance.

In support of this proposition, across a series of studies, lack of trust was associated with less exchange of information between negotiators (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Ewewma, 2006; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998) and more retribution (Ross & LaCroix, 1996). Lack of trust should thus lead negotiators to place high demands on their opponents. Surface acting anger and the ensuing erosion in trust should also harm the relational outcomes of negotiations – intangible assets such as mutual liking and commitment to continuing the relationship (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006) – because negotiators should develop negative attitudes about those who lack integrity.

Overview of the research strategy

We conducted two experiments to examine the consequences of surface acting anger in negotiations. In Experiment 1, we tested the effects of surface acting anger, relative to a neutral control condition,
on the demands of negotiation counterparts and relational outcomes in a face-to-face negotiation. We expected that compared to showing neutral emotions, surface acting emotions would increase demands and harm relational outcomes (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). We further hypothesized that these effects would be mediated by (reduced) trust (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). In Experiment 2, we compared the effects of surface acting anger to the effects of both deep acting anger (a strategy that consists of creating both the feeling and the display of anger) and showing neutral emotion in a video-mediated negotiation. We expected that compared to showing neutral emotions, surface acting anger would increase demands due to (reduced) trust (Hypotheses 1a and 2a). We also expected that deep acting anger would decrease demands (Hypothesis 3), and that this association would be mediated by (increased) perceptions of toughness (Hypothesis 4).

Experiment 1

We first conducted an experiment in which participants interacted face-to-face with a confederate in the role of negotiation counterpart. We manipulated emotional expressions by training the confederate to either surface act anger or show no emotion during the negotiation. We examined the effects of surface acting anger on the demands of the counterparts and relational outcomes assessed by the counterparts. We tested Hypothesis 1a that compared to showing no emotion, surface acting anger would increase demands, and Hypothesis 2a that (reduced) trust would mediate the effect of surface acting anger on demands. In addition, we tested Hypothesis 1b that surface acting anger would be associated with poorer relational outcomes and Hypothesis 2b that (reduced) trust would mediate the negative effect of surface acting anger on relational outcomes.

Method

Participants

Participants were 130 undergraduate students (75 women and 55 men) at a large university and individuals from the community between the ages of 19 and 50 (M = 22.19, SD = 4.29). They participated in exchange for credit or monetary compensation of 10 dollars. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which the counterpart surface acted anger (n = 65) or a control condition in which the counterpart did not show emotion (n = 65). The dependent variables were demands and relational outcomes.

Procedure

An experimenter welcomed participants to a laboratory room. Participants sat on one of two chairs put in front of each other. They were informed that they would be doing a two-person exercise that involved negotiating the price of a used car. They were told that they had been randomly assigned to the role of the seller, and that the other participant, who was receiving instructions in the other room, had been randomly assigned to the role of the buyer. The experimenter then said that she would get the other participant outside of the laboratory room after every two rounds of negotiation so that the experimenter could administer questionnaires. A round was defined as an offer by the buyer and a counteroffer by the seller (if the seller declined the offer). The experimenter verified that participants understood the instructions. The experimenter then said that she would get the other participant from the other room and that they would negotiate in the current room because, in the scenario, the buyer visits the seller.

When the counterpart (a confederate) entered the room, he was introduced to the participant. We chose a confederate to regulate anger to have greater control over the display of the counterpart. Past research shows individual variation in the ability to regulate displays of emotions in laboratory experiments (Gyurak et al., 2009; Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demarée, 2008), suggesting that some participants may not have been able to follow instructions to surface act anger and, hence, introduced considerable noise in the data. Three separate individuals acted as confederates in both conditions. The confederates followed scripted protocols for the initial greetings, the first offer, and the second offer. We wrote the scripts so that they could realistically follow any statement by participants. The only variable was whether the confederates surface acted anger or remained emotionally neutral throughout the interaction.

The confederates were Caucasian male actors who were close in age to the participants. We hired actors because reading a script while modifying displays of emotions is challenging, and actors receive formal training for modifying emotional expressions. Actors have been hired to create similar stimuli in past research (e.g., Bono & Ilies, 2006; Grandey et al., 2005; Van Kleef et al., 2009), including negotiation studies (e.g., Kogelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). We chose male actors because past research has suggested that expressing anger is less appropriate for females (Kring, 2000; Timmers, Fischer, & Mansstead, 1998). The confederates did not know the goals and the hypotheses of the study.

We trained the confederates to regulate their emotions as required by the experimental conditions. We adapted procedures used by Grandey et al. (2005) to train confederates to regulate emotions in simulated customer service interactions and procedures used by Levenson and his colleagues (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & Levenson, 2005) to instruct participants to regulate emotions in the laboratory. For the surface acting anger condition, we instructed the confederates to remain emotionally neutral inside but express anger in their faces. They followed these instructions by manipulating only their facial muscles without modifying their thoughts, subjective experiences of emotions, or vocal cues such as vocal tone and intensity.

1 Participants who received credit (n = 72) did not differ from those who were paid (n = 58) on the proposed mediator, trust, t(128) = .13, p = .90, the first measure of demands, t(128) = 1.79, p = .08, the second measure of demands, t(128) = 1.30, p = .19, and the measure of relational outcomes, t(127) = .30, p = .77. Thus, we combined the participants in the analyses.

2 ANOVAs revealed no significant differences across the three confederates on trust, F(2, 127) = 1.12, p = .33, the first measure of demands, F(2, 127) = 1.65, p = .20, and the second measure of demands, F(2, 127) = 1.35, p = .26, and the measure of the relational outcomes, F(2, 126) = 3.06, p = .0502. Thus, we combined the results from the three confederates in the analyses.
Confederates were further instructed to lower their eyebrows and draw them together, and to ensure that their eyes are glaring and their jaw is clenched. For the neutral condition, we instructed the confederates to relax facial muscles so as to avoid showing emotion. We stressed the importance of keeping all other aspects of behavior constant across the conditions. The confederates obtained feedback from experimenters and students uninvolved with this project to help them calibrate their acting and expressions prior to the study.

Participants made the opening statement, as requested by the instructions. The counterpart then made a number of statements about the car and listed a number of concerns about it. At the end of this speech, the counterpart offered $2400 for the car. Participants decided to accept or reject the offer, and proposed a counteroffer. The counterpart then made a number of other statements about the car and repeated several concerns about it. This speech was designed so that it could reasonably follow any statement and offer by participants. At the end of this speech, the counterpart offered $2550. Participants again decided to accept or reject that offer, and proposed a counteroffer. After the end of this second round, the confederate got up to find the experimenter outside of the room. The experimenter re-entered the room and assigned the participant and the confederate to two computers that were separated by other computers so that they could not see each other’s responses. Participants filled out the measures of trust, relational outcomes, and manipulation checks described below. The confederate stayed in the room to alleviate suspicion and filled out the questionnaires randomly. When participants finished the questionnaires, the experimenter asked the confederate if he was done, and he said yes. The experimenter announced that the experiment was over. The experiment lasted approximately 1 h, with the actual negotiation lasting approximately 10 min. There was little variation in the duration of the actual negotiation because the responses of the confederate were predetermined and largely constant for all participants. At the end, the experimenter debriefed participants and asked them not to discuss the study with anyone.

**Measures**

All measures in this article used a Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), unless otherwise noted.

**Manipulation checks.** To verify that we successfully manipulated expressed anger, participants rated how much the counterpart displayed anger and neutrality, using items from Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006). All items followed the stem “The buyer appeared ...” Three items assessed displays of anger (“angry,” “irritated,” and “aggravated;” alpha = .91) and another three items assessed neutral displays (“unemotional,” “dispassionate,” and “neutral;” alpha = .72).

Past theory and research proposed that surface acting emotions is associated with displays that are perceived as inauthentic (Côté, 2005; Grandey et al., 2005). To verify that displays of anger were perceived as inauthentic and, thus, that the confederates were surface acting, we used six items assessing the authenticity of displays of emotions adapted from Grandey et al. (2005) and Frank, Ekman, and Friesen (1993). Sample items were “The buyer was faking how he felt” (reversed scored) and “The buyer genuinely expressed emotions” (alpha = .87).

**Demands.** There were two measures of demands. The first measure occurred after the first offer of $2400 by the counterpart, and the second measure occurred after the second offer of $2550 by the counterpart. Participants proposed counteroffers by saying the amount that they wanted for their car. The confederate reported the counteroffers after each session ended. We verified that the counteroffers were correct using video-tapes of the sessions. The confederate was correct in each case.

Relational outcomes. We used five items from past research (Van Kleef et al., 2004a) to create a composite measure of relational outcomes (alpha = .88): “I am satisfied with the course of the negotiation,” “I would like to do business with the same buyer in the future,” “I have a good feeling about the negotiation,” “I would like to avoid future negotiations with the same buyer,” and “I am pleased with this negotiation.” One participant skipped this measure.

**Trust.** We used three items to assess participants’ trust in the buyer (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). Participants rated the degree to which the buyer was “trustworthy,” “unreliable” (reverse scored), and “honest” (alpha = .77).

**Results**

**Manipulation checks**

**Displayed anger.** As expected, participants perceived that their counterpart was more angry in the surface acting anger condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.62) than in the neutral condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.23), t(128) = 8.64, p < .001 (d = 1.21). Participants also perceived the counterpart to be more emotionally neutral in the neutral condition (M = 4.01, SD = 1.30) than in the surface acting anger condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.42), t(128) = 3.12, p < .01 (d = .53). These results indicate that the displays were manipulated as intended.

**Authenticity.** As expected, participants perceived the opponent to be less authentic in the surface acted anger condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.25) than in the neutral condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.19), t(128) = 2.91, p < .01 (d = .50).

**Focal analyses**

**Effect of surface acted anger on demands.** Before conducting our main analyses, we examined whether women and men behaved differently, given that gender differences in negotiation behavior were found in some past research (e.g., Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). There were no gender differences on the first counteroffer, t(128) = .41, p = .68 (d = .07), nor the second counteroffer, t(128) = .29, p = .78 (d = .05). Thus, we combined the data from male and female participants, and we did not control for gender in the analyses.

Hypothesis 1a predicted that participants would be more intransigent with a counterpart who surface acts anger than with an emotionally neutral counterpart. We tested this hypothesis for each round using t tests to compare demands across the conditions. Fig. 1 presents the level of demands in each condition by round. In Round 1, demands in the surface acting anger condition (M = 3109.23, SD = 173.86) did not differ from demands in the neutral emotion condition (M = 3087.68, SD = 187.31), t(128) = .68, p = .50 (d = .12). In Round 2, demands in the surface acting anger condition (M = 2943.08, SD = 196.63) were significantly higher than demands in the neutral condition (M = 2873.83, SD = 189.17), t(128) = 2.05, p < .05 (d = .35). Thus, participants were more intransigent with opponents who surface acted anger, but only in the second round. Hypothesis 1a was partially supported. We further interpret this finding in the discussion.

**Effect of surface acting anger on trust.** We expected that participants would trust a counterpart who surface acts anger less than an emotionally neutral counterpart. As expected, trust was lower in the surface acting anger condition (M = 4.29, SD = .96) than in the neutral emotion condition (M = 5.26, SD = .88), t(128) = 6.01, p < .001 (d = .94).

**Mediation of the effect of surface acting anger (relative to neutral emotion) on demands.** Our mediational model predicted that higher demands in
the surface acting anger condition (relative to the control condition) would be explained by (reduced) trust (Hypothesis 2a). We tested this mediational model with the second counteroffer, because the second counteroffer in the surface acting anger condition was significantly higher than in the neutral condition. The results of this analysis are displayed in the top panel of Fig. 2. When accounting for the associations between surface acting anger and trust, $b = -0.97$, $t(128) = 6.01$, $p < .001$ ($f^2 = .28$), and between trust and demands, $b = -45.13$, $t(128) = 2.81$, $p < .01$ ($f^2 = .06$), the original association between surface acting anger and demands was no longer significant, $b = 32.42$, $t(127) = .86$, $p = .39$ ($f^2 = .01$). A bootstrapping procedure showed an indirect effect of surface acting anger on demands through trust ($b = 36.83$; 95% confidence interval around $b = .14$ to 85.14; 5000 bootstrap resamples). Thus, surface acting anger increased demands in Round 2, in part, via reduced trust, in support of Hypothesis 2a.

Effect of surface acting anger on relational outcomes. Hypothesis 1b predicted that surface acting anger would hurt relational outcomes, relative to the neutral control condition. As expected, relational outcomes in the surface acting anger condition ($M = 3.47$, $SD = .99$) were poorer than in the neutral condition ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.02$), $t(127) = 4.49$, $p < .001$ ($d = .74$), in support of Hypothesis 1b.

Mediation of the effect of surface acting anger (relative to neutral emotion) on relational outcomes. We predicted in Hypothesis 2b that the poorer relational outcomes in the surface acting anger condition (relative to the control condition) would be explained by (reduced) trust. The results of this analysis are displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 2. When accounting for the associations between surface acting anger and trust and between trust and relational outcomes, $b = .39$, $t(127) = 4.53$, $p < .001$ ($f^2 = .16$), the original association between surface acting anger and relational outcomes was reduced, $b = -.54$, $t(126) = 2.77$, $p < .01$ ($f^2 = .06$). A bootstrapping procedure showed an indirect effect of surface acting anger on relational outcomes through trust ($b = -.25$; 95% confidence interval around $b = -.48$ to -.07; 5000 bootstrap resamples), in support of Hypothesis 2b.

Discussion

In Experiment 1, participants were relatively intransigent in the second round of negotiations and reported poorer relational outcomes with counterparts who surface acted anger. These effects occurred, in part, because participants had little trust in counterparts who surface acted anger. These findings provide initial evidence...
that surface acting anger does not have the favorable consequences that were identified in past research on the effects of showing anger and that surface acting anger instead carries costs for negotiators.

Surface acting anger increased demands on the second, but not on the first counterparty. Past research on the effect of timing on behavior in negotiations (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Sinaceur et al., 2011) may help interpret this result. In multiple-round negotiations, individuals know that more information about their partners may become available after the initial round. Negotiators may thus withhold judgment, leading to no effect of displays in the early round(s) and increasingly important effects across rounds. In Experiment 1, participants may have waited until the second round, when they observed a second instance of surface acting anger by their opponents, to decide how much they trusted their opponents and to adjust their behavior accordingly. Consistent with this interpretation, in prior studies employing more than one round, the effects of displays of emotion on negotiation behavior were not seen on the first round, and the effects became stronger after each round (e.g., Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

By contrast, in single-round negotiations, negotiation counterparts may draw immediate inferences about each other because they do not have the luxury of obtaining any additional information later on. Participants may know that they have garnered all of the information that they will obtain about their opponents after the first and only round. Participants may thus make immediate judgments about how much they trust their opponents and adjust their behavior accordingly by placing high demands on opponents who surface act anger. Prior studies employing single-round scenario-based paradigms typically found effects of displays of emotions in the first and only round (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu et al., 2006). We examine whether surface acting anger has similar immediate effects in single-round negotiations in Experiment 2.

In Experiment 1, we compared the effects of surface acting anger to a neutral emotional display condition. A potential alternative explanation of our results may be that participants demanded less and reported better relational outcomes with neutral counterparts than with counterparts who surface acted anger because they perceived the former to be more poised and in control of the situation (Sinaceur et al., 2011). To address this possibility, in Experiment 2, we compared the effects of surface acting anger to the effects of deep acting anger, a strategy in which individuals change both their external displays of emotions and their internal feelings and, as such, create more authentic displays of emotions.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of surface acting anger in a single-round negotiation to examine whether it will have an immediate effect on the behavior of counterparts. In addition, we compared the effects of surface acting anger to both a neutral emotion condition, as in Experiment 1, and a condition in which negotiators deep acted anger. Deep acting is a strategy for emotion regulation in which individuals influence both their subjective feelings and their public displays of emotions (Côté, 2005; Grandey, 2003; Hochschild, 1983). With deep acting, subjectively felt emotions match external displays of emotion. Because this form of regulation does elicit the subjective experience of the emotion that is displayed, negotiators should have little reason to doubt that the anger that is displayed as a result of deep acting anger is truly felt (Côté, 2005, 2006; Grandey, 2003; Hochschild, 1983). Thus, the effects of deep acting anger should be comparable to those of past research on displayed anger, where opponents had little reason to doubt the authenticity of the displayed anger. Indeed, past research has shown that the displays of emotions generated by deep acting are perceived as authentic (e.g., Grandey, 2003; Henning-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006). We thus suggest that relative to the neutral condition, deep acting anger should decrease counterparts’ demands, consistent with past research on the effects of anger on negotiation outcomes (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b), and surface acting anger should increase demands, as in Experiment 1.

Moreover, these opposite effects should be carried by different mechanisms. Surface acting anger should elicit higher demands than neutral emotions because of (reduced) trust, as in Experiment 1. By contrast, deep acting anger should elicit lower demands than neutral emotions because of (increased) perceptions of toughness. This reasoning is consistent with past research that found that displays of anger that is presumed to be truly felt are interpreted as signals of toughness (Knutson, 1996; Tiedens, 2001) that lead negotiators to infer that opponents will not back away from their positions (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

To test these predictions, we conducted an experiment in which participants interacted with a video-recorded counterpart. We manipulated the regulation of anger in the video-recording. The counterpart made an offer while surface acting anger, deep acting anger, or showing no emotion. Because participants viewed a pre-recorded message, and an actual interaction did not take place, we did not examine relational outcomes in Experiment 2.

We tested whether compared to neutral emotion, surface acting anger would elicit higher demands (Hypothesis 1a) and deep acting anger would elicit lower demands (Hypothesis 3). We expected that two distinct processes would underlie these effects. We predicted that relative to neutral emotion, surface acting anger would reduce trust and that (reduced) trust would mediate the effect of faking anger on demands (Hypothesis 2a). We also predicted that deep acting anger would create perceptions of toughness and that (increased) toughness would mediate the effect of deep acting anger on demands (Hypothesis 4).

Method

Participants

Participants were 140 undergraduate students (66 men and 74 women) at a large university between the ages of 18 and 28 (M = 20.87, SD = 1.73). They were compensated with credit that counted toward their final grade in one of their courses. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: surface acting anger (n = 46), deep acting anger (n = 47), and a control condition (n = 47) in which the counterpart did not show emotion. The dependent variable was demands.

Procedure

Between one and six individuals participated in the study at the same time. When they arrived at the laboratory, participants were seated in front of a computer. The entire experiment was conducted on the computer to standardize the instructions and stimuli. Participants wore headphones to listen to the video-recording so that the other participants in the room were not distracted. Participants first read the instructions for the negotiation. They were provided with a hard copy of these instructions so that they could refer to them throughout the experiment. Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to learn more about how people negotiate via video-conferencing, because negotiations conducted via this communication medium were becoming increasingly frequent. Participants were told that they would engage in a car selling negotiation and given the details of the negotiation case. As in Experiment 1, we adapted the “Blue Buggy” negotiation exercise (Paulson, 2006). The information that participants were provided was the same as in Experiment 1.

After reading the information, participants were asked to watch the buyer’s video-recorded offer, decide whether to accept or reject the offer, and, if they rejected the offer, propose a counteroffer. They were informed that the buyer’s message had been video-recorded to make
the experience real and involving. They viewed a 90-second video-recording of the potential buyer making an offer. After we developed this script, we asked two experts who teach undergraduate and graduate level courses in negotiations at different universities to review it. Both experts rated the script as highly realistic and as neutral in emotional tone.

The potential buyer introduced himself and said that he was a university student who was hoping to buy a decent used car. He stated a number of features of the car, such as its condition, size, and gas performance. He then mentioned a few concerns with the car, such as the need for body work and new tires. He said that for these reasons, he could not pay $3500, and offered $2400 instead. We chose the value of $2400 because it was below the lower bound of the bargaining zone according to the expert’s evaluation of the car. Thus, we could expect a large proportion of participants to reject the offer and then propose a counteroffer, which was the dependent variable. In a pre-test with a separate sample, 96% of individuals rejected this offer.

There were three versions of the video-recording, one for each experimental condition. The script was exactly the same across the conditions, but the displays varied. We hired three actors and filmed them in the same room where the participants completed the experiment. The actors were asked to memorize the script one week in advance. We instructed the actors to deliver the script while deep acting anger, surface acting anger, or not expressing any emotions. Prior to filming each version of the script, we gave the actors instructions on how to regulate their displays based on procedures used in past research (Grandey et al., 2005; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Kunzmann et al., 2005) as in Experiment 1. For the deep acting anger condition, the actors were instructed to recall an event that had truly made them feel angry. These instructions were designed to make the actors truly feel angry again about this event and, thus, express anger that they truly feel while reciting the script. For the surface acting condition, the actors were asked to “put on a show” and pretend to be angry. As in Experiment 1, we instructed the confederates to lower their eyebrows and draw them together and to ensure that their eyes are glaring and their jaw is clenched. These instructions were designed to make them only show anger in their face and, thus, express anger that they do not truly feel. Prior to filming the neutral condition, the actors were instructed to be business-like and to relax the muscles in their faces so as to show no emotion. Each actor recited the script in each condition several times in front of the video camera. All of the video-recordings were then rated by each author independently and blind to condition on the intensity of anger and the authenticity of expression of emotion. The ratings of the authors converged on the same actor as being the best. This actor was invited to refilm some of the video-recordings. We then selected the video-recordings of this actor that best met the desired criteria (i.e., the anger expression conditions were rated equally high in anger, and the surface acting anger condition was rated lower in authenticity than the deep acting anger condition).

Past research showed that inauthentic displays of emotions are less symmetrical than authentic displays (Ekman et al., 1981; Hager & Ekman, 1985). To verify that the authenticity of the displays was manipulated as intended, we assessed the symmetry of the displays of anger in the video-recordings. We first divided each video-recording into 5-second segments. Two raters then independently watched each segment and assigned a score of 1 if the display was symmetrical and 0 if it was asymmetrical. We calculated intra-class correlations to estimate the amount of variance observed within segments and across raters (Bliese, 2000). ICCs were .73 for fake anger and .69 for genuine anger, showing adequate inter-rater reliability. As expected, displays were coded as more symmetrical in the deep acting anger (M = .81, SD = .40) than in the surface acting anger condition (M = .47, SD = .52), t(28) = 2.09, p < .05.

After viewing the video-recording, participants indicated whether they accepted the buyer’s offer. If they rejected the offer, they proposed a counteroffer. These questions were followed by measures of mechanisms, manipulation checks, and demographic questions. We included the manipulation checks after the measures of the dependent variable to avoid priming participants to think about the displays and authenticity of emotions while deciding whether to accept or reject the offer and what to counter-offer. Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment, which lasted about half an hour. Within this half hour, the negotiation lasted about 3 min. This included the 90-s video plus the time participants took to respond to the video.

Measures

Manipulation checks. We used the same measures of perceived anger (alpha = .88), neutral emotion (alpha = .70), and authenticity (alpha = .82) as in Experiment 1.

Demands. The dependent variable was the demands of participants following the counterpart’s initial offer of $2400. As expected, almost all participants (137 out of 140, or 98%) rejected this offer. One additional participant did not respond to this question. After rejecting the offer, participants proposed a counteroffer by indicating the amount that they wanted for their car. The four participants with missing values for demands were removed from the analyses involving demands (but not the other analyses).

Trust. We used the same three items as in Experiment 1 (alpha = .82).

Perceived toughness. We used three items to assess participants’ perceptions of the buyer’s toughness. Participants rated the degree to which the buyer was “tough,” “competitive,” and “ambitious” (alpha = .62).

Results

Manipulation checks

Displayed anger. The ANOVA on ratings of anger was significant, F(2, 137) = 51.48, p < .001 (η² = .43). Planned contrasts revealed that participants provided lower ratings of anger in the control condition (M = 2.80, SD = 1.12) than in the deep acting anger condition (M = 5.20, SD = 1.29), t(137) = 8.90, p < .001 (d = 1.40) and the surface acting anger condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.48), t(137) = 8.65, p < .001 (d = 1.37). Also, the surface acting anger condition and the deep acting anger condition did not differ from each other in their ratings of anger, t(137) = .20, p = .84 (d = .03). The similar level of intensity indicates that any difference in the effects of surface acting anger and deep acting anger is not due to a difference in the intensity with which anger is displayed.

The ANOVA on ratings of neutral emotion was also significant, F(2, 137) = 36.18, p < .001 (η² = .35). As expected, participants perceived the counterpart as more neutral in the neutral condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.16) than in the deep acting anger condition (M = 3.28, SD = 1.18), t(137) = 6.52, p < .001 (d = 1.10) and the surface acting anger condition (M = 2.90, SD = 1.37), t(137) = 2.05, p < .001 (d = 1.35). Also, the surface acting anger condition and the deep acting anger condition did not differ from each other in their ratings of anger, t(137) = .20, p = .84 (d = .03). The similar level of intensity indicates that any difference in the effects of surface acting anger and deep acting anger is not due to a difference in the intensity with which anger is displayed.

The ANOVA on ratings of neutral emotion was also significant, F(2, 137) = 7.81, p < .001 (η² = .10). Planned contrasts revealed that, as expected, participants provided lower ratings of authenticity in the surface acting anger condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.22) than in the deep acting anger condition (M = 3.95, SD = .89), t(137) = 2.35, p < .05 (d = .46) and the control condition (M = 4.31, SD = 1.11), t(137) = 3.93, p < .001 (d = .78). The deep acting anger condition
and the neutral emotion condition did not differ from each other in their ratings of authenticity, $t(137) = 1.59, p = .11 \ (d = .31)$.

**Focal analyses**

**Effect of surface acting anger and deep acting anger on demands.** As in Experiment 1, we first examined gender potential differences. Women ($M = 3060.42, SD = 215.25$) placed lower demands than men ($M = 3131.23, SD = 189.49$), $t(134) = 2.03, p < .05 \ (d = .34)$. We repeated all of the analyses using ANCOVA (controlling for gender), and the conclusions were the same. For the sake of simplicity, we report the results of the analyses that do not control for gender.

We had predicted that surface acting anger (Hypotheses 1a) and deep acting anger (Hypothesis 3) would influence the demands of the counterpart, relative to the neutral control condition. An ANOVA on demands was significant, $F(2, 133) = 9.66, p < .001 \ (\eta^2 = .13)$. Participants in the surface acting anger condition exerted higher demands ($M = 3187.19, SD = 181.94$) than those in the neutral condition, ($M = 3053.62, SD = 209.20$), $t(133) = 2.29, p < .05 \ (d = .45)$, in support of Hypothesis 1a. Participants in the deep acting anger condition exerted lower demands ($M = 3006.52, SD = 188.15$) than those in the neutral condition, $t(133) = 2.17, p < .05 \ (d = .42)$, in support of Hypothesis 3. Logically, the two anger conditions also differed from each other, $t(133) = 4.39, p < .001 \ (d = .88)$. These results indicate that participants were relatively lenient with counterparts who deep acted anger, and relatively intransigent with counterparts who surface acted anger (see Fig. 3). Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 3 were supported.

**Effect of surface acting anger and deep acting anger on trust.** We expected that participants would trust a counterpart who surface acted anger less than an emotionally neutral counterpart. The ANOVA on trust was significant, $F(2, 133) = 18.27, p < .001 \ (\eta^2 = .21)$. As expected, trust was lower in the surface acting anger condition ($M = 3.59, SD = 1.22$) than in the neutral condition ($M = 4.98, SD = 1.06$), $t(137) = 6.00, p < .001 \ (d = 1.11)$. In addition, trust was lower in the surface acting anger condition than in the deep acting anger condition ($M = 4.44, SD = 1.07$), $t(137) = 3.68, p < .001 \ (d = .68)$, and lower in the deep acting anger condition than in the neutral condition, $t(137) = 2.34, p < .05 \ (d = .43)$.

**Effect of surface acting anger and deep acting anger on perceptions of toughness.** We expected that participants would perceive a counterpart who deep acts anger to be tougher than an emotionally neutral counterpart. The ANOVA on perceived toughness was significant, $F(2, 137) = 4.89, p < .01 \ (\eta^2 = .07)$. Perceived toughness was higher in the deep acting anger condition ($M = 5.31, SD = 1.18$) than in the neutral condition ($M = 4.72, SD = 1.04$), $t(137) = 2.73, p < .01 \ (d = .55)$.

In addition, perceived toughness was higher in the surface acting anger condition ($M = 5.30, SD = .89$) than in the neutral condition, $t(137) = 2.68, p < .01 \ (d = .54)$. However, it was not higher in the deep acting anger than in the surface acting anger condition, $t(137) = .04, p = .97 \ (d = .01)$.

Participants perceived counterparts who expressed any anger as tough. We report the results of a follow-up experiment to illuminate this result below.

**Mediation of the effect of surface acting anger (relative to neutral emotion) on demands.** We predicted in Hypothesis 2a that higher demands in the surface acting anger condition (relative to the neutral control condition) would be explained by low trust. The results of this analysis are displayed in the top panel of Fig. 4. When accounting for the associations between surface acting anger and trust, $b = −1.39, t(91) = 5.88, p < .001 \ (f^2 = .28)$, and between trust and demands, $b = −63.15, t(88) = 4.33, p < .001 \ (f^2 = .21)$, the original association between surface acting anger and demands was no longer significant, $b = 9.28, t(87) = .20, p = .84 \ (f^2 = .00)$. A bootstrapping procedure showed an indirect effect of surface acting anger on demands through trust ($b = 84.29; 95\% \text{ confidence interval around } b = 33.68 \text{ to } 150.43; 5000 \text{ bootstrap resamples}$). These results indicate that surface acting anger increased demands because of reduced trust, consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, and in support of Hypothesis 2a.

**Mediation of the effect of deep acting anger (relative to neutral emotion) on demands.** In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that lower demands in the deep acting anger condition (relative to the neutral control condition) would be explained by perceptions of toughness. The results of this analysis are displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 4. When accounting for the associations between deep acting anger and toughness, $b = .59, t(92) = 2.56, p < .05 \ (f^2 = .07)$, and between toughness and demands, $b = –46.86, t(91) = 2.63, p < .01 \ (f^2 = .08)$, the original association between deep acting anger and demands was no longer significant, $b = –63.74, t(90) = 1.52, p = .13 \ (f^2 = .03)$. Moreover, a bootstrapping procedure showed an indirect effect of deep acting anger on demands through toughness ($b = –23.36; 95\% \text{ confidence interval around } b = –63.33 \text{ to } –421; 5000 \text{ bootstrap resamples}$). Deep acting anger increased demands due to higher perceptions of toughness, consistent with the findings of past research (e.g., Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) and in support of Hypothesis 4.

**Discussion**

The findings of Experiment 2 provide additional evidence that the effects of surface acting anger are detrimental to negotiation outcomes, and are opposite to the beneficial effects of showing anger in negotiations found in previous studies. In particular, consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 shows that surface acting anger increases demands due to reduced trust. At the same time, deep acting anger decreases demands because it increases perceptions of toughness. What is common to the displays of anger examined in past research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b) and the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2 is that the observers had no reason to doubt that the anger that is displayed is not truly felt. The fact that we replicate past findings in the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2 supports this notion. The results are different in the surface acting condition because observers of anger trusted the expresser less. The same emotion, anger, had opposite effects on negotiation outcomes depending on how it was regulated.

Experiment 2 also extended the previous findings by showing that surface acting anger can have immediate effects on the behavior of negotiation counterparts if there is only one round of negotiations.
Fig. 4. Results from Experiment 2. Top panel: Mediation of the effect of surface acting anger (relative to showing no emotion) on the demands of the opponent, via the trust of the opponent. Bottom panel: Mediation of the effect of deep acting anger (relative to showing no emotion) on the demands of the opponent, via perceived toughness of the opponent. Values are unstandardized coefficients. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Experiment 2 follow-up

Experiment 2 yielded an unexpected finding: both surface acting anger and deep acting anger were perceived as tough. Surface acting anger may be perceived as tough for a different reason than deep acting anger. Specifically, surface acting may communicate that negotiators are willing to break rules, as they are showing emotions that they do not truly feel, to gain what they want. In contrast, deep acting may communicate that negotiators are ambitious. To shed light on this issue, we collected additional data from 148 undergraduate students who did not participate in the main experiments. We randomly assigned them to view the surface acting anger, deep acting anger, or neutral video-recording from Experiment 2. We administered the three-item toughness scale (α = .70) along with an item to assess ambition (“He is determined to do well in this negotiation”) and an item to assess willingness to break rules (“He is willing to be dishonest to gain something in this negotiation”), rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Again, both deep acting and surface acting anger were perceived as tough (relative to neutral). There was an indirect effect of surface acting anger (relative to neutral) on toughness through willingness to break rules (b = .14; 95% C.I. around b = .02 to .37), but not through ambition (b = .07; 95% C.I. around b = -.10 to .33). Conversely, there was an indirect effect of deep acting anger (relative to neutral) on toughness through ambition (b = .40; 95% C.I. around b = .15 to .75), but not through willingness to break rules (b = .03; 95% C.I. around b = -.01 to .19). These tentative results suggest that negotiators who deep act anger and surface anger are both perceived as tough, but for different reasons.

General discussion

This research examined the effects of surface acting anger on the behavior of counterparts in negotiations. Taken together, the findings show that individuals place particularly high demands, are relatively dissatisfied, and have relatively little interest in negotiating again with opponents who surface act anger, because they have little trust in them. These findings extend previous work suggesting that expressions of anger in negotiation are beneficial (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Thus, the findings contribute to theory by showing that the same emotion – anger – has opposite consequences on negotiation processes and outcomes depending on whether and how it is regulated and, in turn, on how authentic the display is perceived to be. Thus, adequate theories of anger and conflict resolution should incorporate the role of how displays of anger originate and, hence, the regulation of the displays of anger, because the effects differ in meaningful ways.

In both Experiments, the effects of surface acting were mediated by trust. These mediation findings, along with the addition of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2, alleviate concerns about some alternative explanations of the results. First, neutral counterparts may seem more poised than counterparts who show anger (Sinaceur et al., 2011). The effect in Experiment 1 could have been driven by the neutral condition rather than by the surface acting anger condition, so that participants tended to pose lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised. This concern is alleviated by the inclusion of the deep acting anger condition in Experiment 2. Participants posed even lower demands on counterparts who were neutral because they were more poised.
be perceived as tough, the analyses in Experiment 2 showed that perceived toughness did not mediate the effect of surface acting anger on demands. Finally, the mediations through trust and toughness guard against alternative explanations based on the display and perception of other emotions. For example, recalling anger-inducing event could have induced nervousness in Confederates who deep acted anger. However, in past research, anxious negotiators made low initial offers and ultimately did worse in negotiations than neutral negotiators (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). Thus, it is unlikely that participants would perceive nervous counterparts to be tough and, in turn, pose low demands with these counterparts.

More broadly, our research has implications for social-functional accounts of emotion (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef, 2009). According to this perspective, emotions are not merely internal states—they are expressed and observed by others, and they may influence others’ behavior, cognitions, and emotions. As such, emotions fulfill an important coordinating function in social life. Most theories of the social functions of emotions have not considered whether genuine or deep acted displays of emotions have the same effects as surface acted displays. Our findings indicate that whether and how emotions are regulated need to play more central roles in theoretical accounts of the social effects of emotions.

Our research also contributes to the literature on emotion regulation. Previous research has uncovered consequences of emotion regulation for several intra-individual outcomes, such as well-being, physiology, cognitive functioning, and job performance (e.g., Grandey, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Gyurak et al., 2009). This research has focused principally on the consequences for the person regulating the emotion; few studies have considered the social consequences of emotion regulation (for exceptions, see Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007; Butler et al., 2003; Sivavastava et al., 2009). Research on the social effects of emotions suggests that how people regulate their emotions may have implications for how interaction partners act, think, and feel (Côté, 2005; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009). Our research shows that the social effects of various emotion regulation strategies extend to negotiation behavior, indicating that one’s choice of regulation strategy can have important consequences. More broadly, our research indicates that regulating emotions in a manner that leads observers to doubt the authenticity of the emotions may be a maladaptive strategy during negotiations that creates mistrust and escalates demands.

Caveats and future directions

One limitation of the experiments is that we only used male actors. Some past studies have found that displays of anger by women and men are interpreted differently. These studies have shown that people have more negative reactions when women display anger than when men do (e.g., Gibson, Schweitzer, Callister, & Grey, 2009). This suggests that whether women’s displays of anger originate in surface acting or deep acting may be less important for negotiation outcomes, because the reactions could be more consistently negative. It is important in future research to examine whether reactions to surface acting displays of anger by women are the same ones we found for men.

The use of video-recorded displays of anger in Experiment 2 constitutes another possible limitation. This feature of Experiment 2 provided us with experimental control that increased our confidence about the causal effects. This control, however, came at the expense of mundane realism. We are reassured by the consistency of the results with the video-recording paradigm in Experiment 2 and the face-to-face paradigm in Experiment 1. The findings about surface acting anger were consistent with Experiment 1 in which negotiations occurred face-to-face. The increasing popularity of information technologies as communication media renders findings about computer-mediated negotiations theoretically and practically important (Mckersie & Fonstad, 1997; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). Even so, it is important to investigate the generalizability of the findings to other communication media in future research.

In Experiment 2 in which participants reacted to previously video-recorded counterparts, surface acting anger increased demands on the first (and only) counteroffer. In Experiment 1 in which negotiations took place face-to-face, however, surface acting anger increased demands, relative to neutral displays of emotion, on the second, but not on the first counteroffer. The results for the initial round may have been different because in multiple-round negotiations, such as in Experiment 1, negotiators have the luxury of time to increase their confidence in their impressions of their counterparts. Negotiators may thus not act fully from these impressions or act on them until later rounds. In single-round negotiations, such as in Experiment 2, negotiators may need to form impressions and act on them immediately.

Another possibility is that negotiators are more focused on their counterparts’ displays of emotions in video-mediated negotiations, as in Experiment 2, than in face-to-face negotiations, as in Experiment 1. In video-mediated negotiations, negotiators may be focused primarily on the video, which would increase their likelihood of identifying and responding to how anger is regulated. This may explain why we detected an effect of surface acting anger in the initial (and only) round in Experiment 2. In face-to-face negotiations, there may be more distractions and more stimuli that negotiators try to focus on simultaneously. It would thus take longer to pick up on how anger is regulated. This may explain why we did not find an effect in round 1 (of 2) in Experiment 1. These dynamics should be examined in future research on how displays of anger shape negotiations over time and via different media.

Finally, in this investigation, we examined the effects of using surface acting to create a completely new display of anger that did not previously exist. We did not examine the effects of using surface acting to exaggerate a display of anger that previously existed. It is possible that surface acting anger has different consequences when it is used to exaggerate a relatively low level of anger that already exists than when it is used to create a completely new display. This issue should be examined in future research.

Conclusion

The present research contributes to the literature on anger in negotiations by demonstrating that the effects of fake anger are different than the effects of showing genuine anger or showing no emotion. Genuine anger elicits concessions, but fake anger elicits demands in negotiation counterparts. Thus, the source and authenticity of the displays of anger have to be considered to obtain a complete understanding of the role of expressed anger in negotiations. The strategic management of anger has important consequences for the behavior of parties during negotiation, and, we suspect, for social behavior in general.

References


